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RESUMEN
Recientemente, la investigación en economía bancaria ha tratado de establecer en qué
medida la innovación financiera y la tecnología están afectando a los costes, los
ingresos y los beneficios. La mayor parte de los estudios no han encontrado
complementariedades en costes, beneficios o ingresos ni entre las actividades
tradicionales y las no tradicionales ni entre las tradicionales entre sí. En este estudio
se analizan estas complementariedades en un entorno de ‘banca amplia’: el sector
bancario español. Los resultados indican que, tras incluir las operaciones fuera de
balance en el mix productivo, las economías de gama en costes y beneficios se
incrementan de forma significativa. Asimismo, la valoración que los consumidores
realizan de los servicios bancarios se detecta únicamente cuando las operaciones fuera
de balance se consideran en la definición de output.
Palabras clave: banca, costes, beneficios, economía de gama, operaciones fuera
de balance.
ABSTRACT
There is a recent trend in banking research aiming to assess how financial innovation
and technology are affecting bank cost, revenue and profits. Most of the studies have
not found significant cost, profit or revenue complementarities either between
traditional and non-traditional banking products or between traditional activities
themselves. We study complementarities in a ‘broad banking’ environment: the
Spanish banking sector. The results indicate that after including off-balance sheet
business in the output mix, cost and profit scope economies increase significantly.
Besides, consumer valuation of financial services is only detected when the off-balance
sheet business is added to the output definition. 
Keywords: banking, cost, profit, scope economies, off-balance sheet.
JEL Classification: G21, L11
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1. Introduction
Financial innovation and technology have been introducing new products and service
delivery channels. These trends are affecting bank cost, revenue and profit complementarities.
There are some previous studies for the US banking industry, most of which have not found
significant complementarities either between traditional banking products (loans and deposits) or
between those traditional activities and off-balance sheet business (Clark, 1988; Pulley and
Braunstein 1992; Mester, 1992; Pulley and Humphrey, 1993; Jagtiani et al., 1995; Humphrey and
Pulley, 1997; or Rogers, 1998). The main contribution of this paper is to show the extent to which
these results are conditioned by the use of traditional output mix definitions that do not properly
account for innovations in banking production function, informational complementarities or
technological improvements. It should be noted that comparisons between different studies are
conditioned by differences in regulation that have limited the scope of bank activities and a variety
of methodological approaches employed to estimate cost (profit or revenues) complementarities.
Some studies have sufficiently dealt with output definition problems and methodological
issues separately but, to our knowledge, not simultaneously. Moreover, there is a lack of studies
that measure output complementarities in countries where banks have been traditionally permitted
to offer a broad range of financial products. Competitive issues are also of great importance here
and the use of industrial organization (IO) tools and theoretical assumptions appears relevant for
this type of analysis.
In this study, we aim to test how output innovation and product mix definition may, at least
partially, explain the existence of cost, revenue or profit complementarities in the banking sector, as
the standard theoretical models of the banking firm show. To test these hypotheses we estimate
cost,p rofit and revenue complementarities in Spanish banking using a composite cost function and
including various on and off-balance sheet output measures. Specifically, loan commitments and
mutual fund distribution activities are considered along with traditional lending, deposits-taking and
securities activities. The Spanish banking system is a good laboratory since –unlike the US before
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999- banks have been allowed to offer all sort of financial products
and engage in all kinds of financial businesses for, at least, two decades. The estimation of cost
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and profit complementarities permits to assess how off-balance sheet business may increase the
informational and customer relationship properties of banking (hypothesis 1) and generate cross-
selling advantages (hypothesis 2). Additionally, the revenue side will provide with an estimate of the
valuation of ‘broad banking’ by customers (hypothesis 3). Finally, changes in market power and in
market structure with off-balance sheet activities (hypothesis 4) are also estimated.
The paper is divided in five different sections. In section 2, we survey the main institutional
and empirical background with regard to the effects of the regulatory treatment of broad banking on
bank costs and profits. Next, section 3 contains the methodological background and the discussion
of the hypothesis of this research. Section 4 analyses various issues with regard to the data and the
empirical approach of the paper. Section 5 presents the main results. The paper ends with a brief
summary of the conclusions and their policy implications.
2. Institutional and empirical background
2.1. The broadening of banking services
Bank regulation varies both across countries and over time. Although liberalization has
been a dominating trend in international banking during the last decades, there have been
significant differences across countries in the development of financial market and/or intermediaries
activities depending upon, intera lia,h i s t o r i c a le x p e r i e n c eand institutional legal factors.
Thee x pansion of capital markets and intensified competition have resulted in a
considerable reduction of transaction costs and information asymmetries so that financial
intermediation has required a new rationale in the modern financial services industry. Allen and
Santomero (1997) proposed participation costs and risk management as the main factors
explaining the new role of financial institutions. In parallel, Scholtens and Weesveen (2000) suggest
that modern intermediation theories need to explore how banks have conducted risk management
over time. As for the banking industry, universal banking has been shaping as an expression of the
generalized broadening of banking activities, where the degree of specialization depend upon the
objectives and the role played by each institution in its financial system (Santomero and Eckles,
2000).
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In the US, regulation has traditionally prevented banks from engaging in activities such as
portfolio management, mutual or pension fund distribution, insurance or industrial participations
both directly and through subsidiaries. However, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allows US banks to
diversify their portfolio permitting banks to undertake equity management, mutual fund distribution
and other financial activities (Scholtens 1999; Barth et al., 2000). However, non-bank intermediaries
(such as large mutual fund families, insurance companies or brokerage and consulting firms) have a
large and consolidated tradition in offering these or similar services. These agents have dominated
the disintermediation process in the US and they compete directly with banks only since the lifting of
regulatory barriers.
The European tradition is different. Many European banks have enjoyed these ‘broad
banking’ advantages much earlier than the US. A comparative analysis may be useful at this point.
Table 1 shows the regulatory treatment on the mixing of banking, securities and insurance activities
in the US, Japan and the European Union (EU-15) in 1997 (taken from Barth et al., 2000). Mixing
with securities activities was generally unrestricted or permitted in the EU-15 and only few
restrictions applied to insurance activities and ownership of commercial banks and firms. However,
these activities were practically prohibited or restricted in the US and Japan until recently. In any
event, disintermediation have expanded with financial markets, increasing interaction between
banks and capital markets and the traditional distinction between market-based (ie. US, UK) and
institutional-based financial systems (ie. Germany, France, Spain) has been somewhat blurred
(Scholtens, 1999). Nevertheless, the classification between market-based and bank-based financial
systems still appears to be relevant since it is still employed in many international studies and




1 Regulatory restrictions seem to play a key role in characterizing a national financial system as market-based
or bank-based. In an international study covering 1980-1995 data, Levine (2002) employs an aggregated
measure of regulatory restrictions on commercial bank activities for 48 countries. Specifically, he assesses
which national regulatory authorities allow commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance or real state
activities and the extent to which banks can own and control non-financial firms. In this context, Levine finds
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2.2. Cost, revenue and profit issues
Standard models of the banking firm assume the existence of complementarities between
deposit taking and loan supply, since they are viewed as two sides of the same demand liquidity
function although the volume, origin and operative characteristics of both activities are different
(Kashyap et al., 1999). The introduction of innovations beyond traditional banking –such as off-
balance sheet business- is also expected to produce benefits. Firstly, some off-balance sheet
activities represent a technological expansion of lending, as loan commitments -lines of credit,
credit cards- which expand the scope of the customer relationship and its informational properties
(Berger and Udell, 1995; Das and Nanda, 1999; Degryse and Van Caseele, 2000). Secondly, there
are some other non-traditional and fee-earning activities more directly related with portfolio
management and financial markets operations -such as portfolio management and mutual or
pension funds distribution- that are expected to reduce risk (Gallo et al., 1996), increase scale
economies and produce cross-selling benefits (Kane, 1995 and Golter, 1996)
2.
However, the empirical evidence has not supported these theoretical expectations either
between on and off-balance sheet activities or even between traditional activities themselves. The
majority of studies are applied to the US banks. In the cost side, most of the empirical studies have
shownt he existence of scope economies for balance sheet activities (including deposits as an
output) although they are generally small both globally and among output pairs (Benston et al.,
1982; Clark, 1988; Pulley and Braunstein 1992; Pulley and Humphrey, 1993; Noulas et al., 1993;
Ferrier et al., 1993). The few studies analyzing profit complementarities have also found small profit
scope economies among balance sheet outputs although significantly different from zero
(Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; and Rogers, 1998).

that Spain (characterized as a bank-based country) is one of the countries with a lower level of regulatory
restrictions -in line with our definition of broad banking-, and, for example, the US is one of the countries with a
higher level of regulatory restrictions.
2 Appendix A summarizes some of the most important contributions to on- and off-balance sheet
effects on bank cost, profits and revenues.
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As for the few studies analyzing cost and profit complementarities including off-balance
sheet business, the evidence is mixed. Mester (1992) does not find complementarities between
loans and off-balance sheet securitization while Rogers (1998) finds significant but small
complementarities between traditional output and ‘new financial services’. Complementarities also
appear when a wide range of off-balance sheet activities is considered jointly (including derivatives,
collateral and loan commitments) although they vanish as bank size increases (Jagtiani et al.,
1995; Jagtiani and Khantavit, 1996; Clark and Siems, 2002). Finally, Rime and Stiroh (2003)
examine efficiency at Swiss banks using a distribution free approach, finding that off-balance sheet
business introduce both cost and profit inefficiencies compared to a narrow (traditional) definition of
output mix.
Overall, the evidence regarding the benefits of diversification is unclear. In order to estimate
those benefits, three different issues arise in this context: (1) most of the studies refer to the US
before the mixing of banking with other financial activities was permitted; (2) the evolution and
structure of off-balance sheet activities in these studies may differ substantially from other countries
with a larger tradition in broad banking; and (3) the empirical approaches to estimate
complementarities in multioutput technologies have been different. The composite function presents
significant advantages in estimating complementarities in multioutput technologies compared with
translog, quadratic or Fourier-Flexible functions. However, the composite has not been applied, to
our knowledge, to estimate complementarities including off-balance sheet business and the existing
studies refer to industries where broad banking was not permitted
3,a sP ulley and Braunstein (1992)
or Berger et al., (1996) for the US, and McKillop et al., (1996) for giant Japanese banks.
2.3. Relevance of the Spanishc a s e
The Spanish experience may be illustrative, at this point, since Spanish banks have
controlled the largest share of growing ‘disintermediated’ financial flows during the late 1980s and

3 Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) show the relevance of considering different regulatory and economic
environment conditions when estimating cost-efficiency scores (measured by a common frontier) in Spanish
and French banking systems. Significant changes were found when accounting for these variables.
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the 1990s with both a high growth of capital market investments, loan commitments and mutual
funds management, as the main example of the expansion of broad banking (Figure 1). In
particular, mutual funds assets managed by banks rose by 176,5% (in real terms) during 1993-
1999, while loan commitment grew at 89,5% (in real terms) during the same period
4.B r oad banking
is also reflected on-balance sheet business, as shown by the evolution of securities, equity and
industrial participations growing by 35% (in real terms) during 1993-1999. It should be noted that
disintemediation and off-balance sheet expansion has been compatible with traditional business
since customers loans and deposits have experienced also a significant growth (62,1% and 19,7%,
respectively, in real terms)
5.
Financial disintermediation in Spain has been clearly ‘re-conducted’ by banks. Figure 2
showst he bank share in financial intermediation (assets managed by bank and non-bank
intermediaries, respectively, as a percentage of total assets of financial intermediaries) in 1999. The
share of bank intermediation is particularly significant in Spain, where these institutions (including
subsidiaries) controlled more than the 93% of financial intermediation business. The relative weight
of banks is also considerable in France (82,4%) and Germany (74,1%) while in the United Kingdom
(56,1%) and the US (24,8%) is substantially lower, showing the largest competition from non-bank
financial intermediaries in market-based financial systems. This trend is also reflected in the
evolution of non-interest income as a percentage of total income (not shown)
6.T h i sr atio has
increased at 93,4% during 1993-1999 in Spain, at 60,5% in France and at 32,1% in Germany.
However, this growth has been lower in the US (13,9%) and even negative in the United Kingdom (-
7,8%).

4 Thef igure also shows the relative weight of bank intermediaries in conducting ‘disintermediated’ funds in
Spain since bank share of the industry mutual funds assets has always been over 90%, showing the low
competition offered from other non-bank financial intermediaries in selling these products.
5 It is interesting to note that the growth of off-balance sheet contingent assets including guarantees, loan
commitments and documentary credit over bank total assets (including these contingent assets) has changed
from 13,4% to 22,8% during 1993-1999 in Spain.
6 The information on non-interest income has been computed with OECD Bank Profitability data.
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Spanish banks may be enjoying the advantages of institutional-based financial systems
where there is a more limited range of financial investment possibilities for households and firms
and mild non-bank financial competition. This financial structure permitted the so-called
intertemporal risk smoothing, where financial savings remain relatively stable and banks benefit
from long-term contractual (lending) relationships, lowering the price of their loans during economic
downturns and rising it at the top of the business cycle, reducing aggregate and credit rationing
risks (Allen and Gale, 1996; Allen and Santomero, 2001).
3. Methodological background and hypotheses.
3.1. A multioutput framework: direct and indirect function approaches
Global scope economies (GCSE)a r edefined as the percentage change in costs (profits or
revenues) when banking services are offered jointly as opposed as when each service is offered
separately (Mester, 1987). When defining the cost function (TC), the standard approach consists of
variable costs depending on variable input prices, variable output quantities and given input and
output quantities (Berger and Mester, 1997):
(,,) TC TC w y z = (1)
where w is a vector of variable input prices; y is a vector of variable input quantities; and z is a
vector of given netputs
7,i n c l u d e dt os h o wt h ee ffects of given netputso nc o s ts due to their
complementary or substitution relationships with variable netputs
8.T he definition of global scope
economies compares complete specialization with a joint production of financial services. However,
as noted by Pulley and Braunstein (1992) and Berger et al., (1996) complete specialization does
not seem to be a realistic view of bank production and it could be more appropriate to consider
banks as ‘quasi-specialized’ institutions, defining the quasi-specialized cost scope economies
(QCSE)a s :

7 So that 1 (, ..., ) n zz z = and if 0 i z > ,i ti sa no utput, whereas if 0 i z < ,i ti sa ni nput.
8 Following Hughes et al., (2001), we will include deposits as outputs along with loans and other earning
assets, assuming that deposits incorporate transaction costs to the output function.
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where Qi is one of the n on- plus m off-balance sheet outputs, ∈ is the specialization parameter, so
that when ∈=0 expression (2) turns to GCSE.W hen ∈>0 we obtain different measures of sub-
additivity in costs catching both scale and scope effects for a given output mix. Institution size
become a very relevant issue at this point since specialization and sub-additivity change with bank
output level. Output mix strategies vary significantly with bank size.
Together with costs, the profit side in output mix complementarities is highly relevant,
specifically when including off-balance sheet output, where those complementarities are expected
to be larger than cost advantages (Kane, 1995; Golter, 1996; Rogers, 1998). As for profit scope
economies, the definition will depend upon some important assumptions regarding the
maximization and pricing behavior of bank firms. First of all, the standard indirect profit function
approach assumes perfect competition in bank markets, where banks are price-takers in both input
and output markets (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; and Berger and Mester, 1997). Under this
approach, there will be a given vector of on and off-balance sheet outputs (y), av ector of inputs (x)
and also a vector of netputs Q=(y, -x) = (Q1,…, Qn+m,- x 1 ,… ,- x n). Thes tandard profit function is
defined as π = P’Q,w h e r eP is a vector of output prices (p) and input prices (r)s ot h a tP =(p,r)’ =
(p1,...,pn+m,r1,...,rn)’.I nac ompetitive environment, prices became exogenous. However, perfect
competition hypothesis does not seem to be plausible in most banking markets, where a certain
degree of market power is observed (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). Therefore, an alternative indirect
function is employed here, where firms maximize profits for a given vector of output quantities (y)
and input prices (r)c hoosing output prices (p)a l o n gw i t houtput quantities:
π == =
=
, '( , ) ( , - ) ' . . ( , , ) 0
(,) 0




when g(p,y,r,z)i sabank’s pricing opportunity set for given values of y and r in the transformation
function. The Lagrangian yields the optimal choice of output prices (p = p[y,r,z]) and input quantities
(x=x[y,r]), and the alternative indirect profit function is defined as:
ππ == = '[ ( , ) , ] [ , - (,) ] ' (,) PQ py rry x y r y r (4)
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Both cost and profit scope economies will be, then, estimated under the above competitive
assumptions. In any event, output mix needs to be assessed both globally and between (on and off-
balance sheet) output pairs since many scope economies (diseconomies) relationships between
certain outputs can not be assessed separately within the global scope economies definition.





where CSC (PSC)i sdefined as the change in marginal cost (profit) of producing output i relative to
changes in output j,s ot hat when CSC>0 (PSC>0), there are complementarities in costs (profits) of
producing jointly outputs i and j.
Within this theoretical framework, we aim to test the two following hypotheses:
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 Hypothesis 1:I nab r o a db anking environment, expected cost and profit
complementarities between traditional activities (eg. loan supply and deposits-taking)
will increase significantly when their extended informational and technological
properties beyond the balance sheet (lines of credit, loan commitments) are included in
the output mix definition.
 Hypothesis 2:C r o ss-selling cost and profit scope economies or diseconomies between
on and off-balance sheet outputs (not necessarily related to lending activities) may
differ substantially depending on output mix definition.
3.2. Cost and profit scope economies and the one-stop banking hypothesis
At h i r dh y pothesis arises by looking at the revenue side of bank activities. This is the
following:
 Hypothesis 3:C o n s u m e r sv a l u a t i o no fb r o a db anking services (one-stop banking
hypothesis) will only come into light when including traditional and non-traditional
activities jointlyi nt h eoutput mix.
Hypothesis 3 requires some additional assumptions as to evaluate consumer valuation of
broad banking properly. Under certain conditions, revenue scope economies will illustrate synergies
in the joint consumption of financial services (one-stop banking hypothesis). For banks to obtain
greater revenues in the joint production of financial services, output prices have to vary with
different output mixes (Berger et al., 1996). Revenue economies of scope would exist in a
competitive environment only if: (1) consumers are willing to pay a premium for jointly provided
financial services; and (2) there are cost diseconomies of scope. If there were no cost justification
forc harging higher prices for services provided jointly, competition among banks would eliminate
the revenue synergies, even if consumers valued jointness. Therefore, the coexistence of cost and
revenue scope economies will be only possible in a less than perfectly competitive environment.
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Potential reductions in transaction and searching costs for customer may incentive banks to supply
aw i d er a nge of services
9.
Under the same assumptions that in [4], an alternative indirect revenue function (R)i sa l s o
defined to analyze complementarities in consumption. The revenue problem seeks to maximize the
revenue function:
's .t. ( , , ) 0
p Max R p y g p y r ==  8)
and the Lagrangian yields the revenue maximizing prices as functions of y and r:
== = '( , ) '( , ) Rp yp y r yR y r (9)
and the ‘quasi-specialized’ revenue economies of scope (QRSE) and revenue complementarities
(RSC) are defined similarly to profits as in (5) and (7).
3.3. Implications form a r ket competition
Competitive assumptions are needed as to evaluate the robustness of the results.
Moreover, it is interesting to analyze how changes in output mix may alter market power and market
competition since the coexistence of cost and profit (revenue) complementarities is only possible in
al e s st h a tc ompetitive environment, as shown above. Therefore, a fourth hypothesis is also tested:
- Hypothesis 4:T he introduction of new off-balance sheet activities in the bank output mix
(such as loan commitments or mutual fund distribution) will alter market power although likely
associated changes in market competition need to be assessed.
Non-traditional activities may result in pricing strategies (such as price bundling), where
banks seek to compensate a decreasing growth rate of interest revenue with an increase in non-
interest revenue by charging higher prices in non-traditional business.

9 Berger et al., (1996) show that approximating the division of banking services into price-taking versus price-
setting behavior suggests that perhaps one-third of banking revenues are associated with services where price
taking is expected while two-thirds are associated with services where price-setting behavior occurs.
Therefore, the alternative revenue function may reflect better the evolution of bank revenues since banks are
considered as price setters in one or various markets.
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4. Data and empirical approach.
4.1. Data and variable definition
Cost, profit and revenue complementarities are estimated for a large sample of Spanish
banks over 1993-1999 using semi-annual data. This period covers the larger expansion of ‘broad
banking’ in Spain with two main features: (1) a very high growth of mutual funds managed by banks
as the main example of ‘re-conducted disintermediation’ and (2) a simultaneous significant growth
of loan products both on an off-balance sheet (ie. loan commitments)
10.T he sample includes 38
commercial and savings banks summing up to 531 semi-annual observations during 1993-1999
and accounting for 75-80% of the total assets of the Spanish banking industry
11.
In order to estimate scope economies and cost complementarities in a ‘broad banking’
environment, data on costs, profits, revenues, output quantities and input prices is required. The
variables employed in the empirical approach are defined as follows:
 TC:t otal costs, as the sum of all interest and operative costs including deposits, staff
and physical capital costs.
 PF:p r o f i tbefore taxes.
 TR:t otal revenue, including interest and non-interest income.
 LN: Loan portfolio, including customer and interbank loans.
 DP:s i ght and term deposits.
 OE:o t her earning assets different from loans, including securities, shares and industrial
participations.

10 The period also coincides with the post-deregulated competitive environment after the branch liberalization
that took place in Spain in 1989 and the subsequent wave of bank mergers.
11 Ac omplete list of the institutions in the sample is available upon request. In 1993, the sample accounted for
76% of the total assets of the industry and in 1999, the 80%. The total market share in terms of off-balance
sheet business of this sample of banks is even larger (above 95%) over the period. We were unable to include
the smallest savings banks and the cooperative banks in our sample since they do not manage (on their own)
the largest part of their off-balance sheet business and, therefore, this type of data are not available for them.
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 LC:l o a nc o m m i t m ents, including lines of credit and other off-balance sheet loan
commitments (credit cards).
 MF:m utual fund off-balance sheet’ assets.
 DC:p rice of deposits as the ratio ‘interest expenses to short-term funding’ (including
customer and interbank deposits and short-term equity debt).
 SC:u n i ts t a f fc o sts, defined as the ratio ‘staff cost to total number of workers’.
 KC:u nit costs of physical capital as the ratio ‘building maintenance and depreciation to
fixed assets’.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of these variables. All the variables were computed
employing balance sheet and income statement data provided by the Spanish Banking Association
(AEB) and the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks (CECA). Data on mutual funds distribution
is provided by National Financial Markets Commission (CNMV).
4.2. The composite cost function and the output mix
Ac omposite cost function is employed to model the behavior of costs, profits and revenues
in a multioutput framework. Compared with other commonly used functional forms –such as the
translog or quadratic- the composite produces more robust and efficient results in modeling
multioutput technologies (Pulley and Braunstein, 1992). The composite actually nests a standard
translog, a generalized translog and a quadratic functional forms. Multiplicative forms such as the
translog usually impose a strong separability between inputs and outputs and input demand
elasticities are defined equally and independently of changes in input prices. As noted by Carroll
and Ruppert (1984) and Snee (1986) the composite cost function offers an alternative specification
by transforming both sides of the cost (profit or revenue equation) and permitting to model
empirically the dependent variable both in logarithms or in levels as to contrast the results in both
cases. A generalized composite cost function is, then, defined as a Box-Cox transformation of total
costs:
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where qi is the vector of output quantities (i= 1,..., n+m), and rK is the vector of input prices (k=
1,…n). Then, the composite in (10) will adopt a logarithmical form when φ =0 ,w h i l eit will
correspond to a generalized form in levels when φ =1
12.
To estimate the composite function in (10), three inputs (k=1 ,… , 3 )a r edefined as to
compute the price of deposits (DC), labor (SC) and physical capital (KC). Together, three different
outputs are included. We employ two definitions of traditional and non-traditional output mix as to
estimate changes in cost (profit, revenue) complementarities with ‘broad banking’:
 Traditional output mix: (1) loans (LN); (2) deposits (DP); and (3) other earning assets
(OE), representing a traditional balance sheet output mix.
 Augmented output mix: (1) loans (LN) plus loan commitments (LC); (2) deposits (DP);
and (3) other earning assets (OE) plus mutual funds (MF).
Therefore, this methodology consists of aggregating off-balance sheet outputs to similar on-
balance activities so that changes in costs, profit or revenues related to output innovations are
captured. This output aggregation procedure poses a clear advantage since it permits to associate
similar activities so that their informational and strategic characteristics may be jointly assessed.
However, we need to take into account that correlation analysis is imperfect in being able to
accurately identify separate influences among variables that are not actually orthogonal to one
another, as it happens with some of the activities analyzed. Since subadditivity is a combination of
scope and scale effects, the aggregation procedure may not account properly for the effects of
output aggregation in the scale component of global scope economies. One alternative would be to

12 We include a parameter for φ in the empirical estimations as to transform the election of the composite
functional form in a testable hypothesis.
E2004/1315
subtract the known effects of the ‘aggregated’ variables from the cost, revenue and profit data
before estimating the scope relationships. Unfortunately, these values are not known and can only
be approximated in a model with all 5 outputs separately. Therefore, in order to check for the
robustness of the aggregation procedure to scale effects with output changes, a five-output
composite function is also defined with the following output mix:
-A lternative five-output definition: (1) loans (LN); (2) loan commitments (LC); (3) deposits
(DP); (4) other earning assets (OE); and (5) mutual funds (MF).
With these input prices and output mix definitions global cost, profit and revenue economies
of scope (GCSE, GPSE and GRSE)c a nbe estimated following equation (10), having in mind the
structural form of the cost, profit and revenue functions in (1), (4) and (9), respectively. The reduce
form of the cost( a l t e r natively profit or revenue) equation would be:
φφ φ φ ε =≅ +
() () () () () { ( , l n ) e x p [ ( l n ) ] } TC or PF or TR F q r G r (11)
so that ‘quasi specialized’ cost, profit or revenues economies of scope (QCSE, QPSE and QRSE)
are defined as:
αα
≠ =  0
1
[( -1) - ]/ ( ,ln )
2
iij ij i QCSE m q q F q r (12)
αα
≠ =−  0
1
() [ ( - 1 ) + ] / ( , l n )
2
iij ij i QPSE or QRSE m q q F q r (13)
Then, to analyze sub-additivity from complete diversification ( 0 ∈= )t oc o m plete
specialization ( 1/m ∈= ),s i xd i fferent specialization levels are defined between 0 ∈= and ∈=1/m
for the threeo u t p u td e f i n ition ( 0 ∈= , 0.01 ∈= , 0.05 ∈= , 0.1 ∈= , 0.2 ∈= , 0.3 ∈= )
13 and the
alternative 5-output definition ( 0 ∈= , 0.01 ∈= , 0.05 ∈= , 0.1 ∈= , 0.15 ∈= , 0.2 ∈= ). ‘Quasi
specialized’ economies of scope permit to undertake an additional analysis by separating global

13 As shown in (2) this methodology permits to analyze sub-additivity from pure scope economies ( 0 ∈= )t o
pure scale economies ( 1/m ∈= ). Significance (standard errors) of scope economies and complementarities
estimations are obtained following the procedure illustrated by Pulley and Braunstein (1992), consisting of
differentiating the scope equation with respect to the composite parameters and obtaining the values of the
gradient at convergence and the variance and covariance matrix.
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scope economies in two components, fixed scope economies and complementarities. From (12)
and (13) we will have:
1
[( -1) / ( ,ln )] - [ / ( ,ln )]
2
1
() [ ( - 1 ) / ( , l n ) ] + [ / ( , l n ) ]
2
() [
ii i j ij i
ii i j ij i
QCSE m F q r q q F q r
QPSE or QRSE m F q r q q F q r












4.3. Controlling for changes in competition with output innovations
Hypothesis 4 assumes that adding off-balance sheet activities alter market power, while
changes in the underlying market structure should be evaluated. Testing this hypothesis will also
provide estimated scope economies with robustness since the validity of these results depend on
the competitive assumptions mentioned above. Two different procedures are employed to achieve
this goal following the New Industrial Organization literature. The first one is the H-statistic proposed
by Panzar and Rosse (1987) to study the underlying market structure. The second one refers to
changes in competition over time and consists in the estimation of the mark-up of price over
marginal costs and the Lerner Index for various output definitions.
TheH -statistic is defined as the elasticity of total revenues to changes in factor prices and it
is computed following other studies such as De Bandt and Davis, (2000); and Bikker and Haaf
(2002). The empirical approach consists in the estimation of the following equation:
ln (ln , ln , ln( / ), ln( / )) i TR h r Q LN Q DP funding = (15)
where lnTR is log of total interest and non-interest revenues; lnri =l ogs of three input prices (price
of deposits and other funding; price of labor, and price of physical capital). There is an output
capacity controlv a r i a ble, lnQ -which is the value of total output- and two specialization variables,
ln(LN/Q)- the ratio of loans to total assets- and ln(DP/funding)- the log of the ratio of the value of
deposits in total bank funding. The H-statistic is the sum of the derivatives, δδ  ln / ln i TR r .H
canb en e gative (input costs falling and revenue rising) suggesting strong monopoly power. If H =
1.0, then changes in costs are passed on to output prices, suggesting perfect competition. When H
is positive but less than 1.0, monopolistic competition holds. The empirical approach of the H-
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statistic to banking requires to assume that banks are single product firms. Similarly to the
multioutput approach, two main definitions of total output are given. The first one only includes on-
balance sheet assets. The second one incorporates off-balance sheet innovations by adding loan
commitments and mutual funds to the output definition
14.I no r der to measure the effect of non-
interest revenue on competition we also include the estimation for interest revenue alone. The H-
statistic equation in [15] is estimated using a fixed-effects panel data model
15.
Changes in market power over time are inferred by estimating the Lerner index. The Lerner
index can be derived from a general profit maximization function in a market with m firms:
() - ( , ) 1, . ..,
j
jj j j j j q Max p y y c y w with y y j m Π=  ==  (16)
where Πis the profit function of bank j; p is the output price; and c(yi,wj) is the cost function of bank
k,w here yi is the output quantity and wj is the vector of input prices. From first order conditions we
obtain:
11










where the mark-up of price over marginal costs ((p- c’(yi,wj))e q uals the inverse of the semi-
elasticity of demand (1/ε*) times a market structure parameter (θj). The Lerner index will be, then,
defined as the mark-up relative to output price ([(p- c’(yi,wj)]/p). Since marginal cost has to be
estimated, the composite function is employed here also to estimate the marginal cost of total
output.

14 The estimation of marginal cost within a multioutput framework will give different marginal cost estimations
for each one of the outputs analyzed so that a price will have to be defined for each one of these outputs and
the overall changes in competition could not be globally assessed.
15 As noted by Bresnahan (1989) the H-statistic results will only be consistent when the industry is in long-run
equilibrium. The standard procedure is to estimate the H-statistic using the ratio of net income to total assets
(ROA) as the dependent variable. If the value of the H-statistic is not significantly different from zero, the
industry is presumed to be in long-run equilibrium. It should be also taken into account that the robustness of
the H-statistic results increases with the time period considered so that we do not split the time horizon to
guarantee robustness in a long-run perspective.
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Since the aim is to compare the effect of output innovations on competition, the Lerner
index is estimated considering total assets and total assets plus off-balance sheet (including loan
commitments and mutual funds) as the output definitions, in order to find out if the level of
competition varies significantly with output innovations. The Lerner is computed for two time periods
(1993-1995 and 1996-1999) separated by the advent of the Single Market in Europe and a change
in the business cycle.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Cost and profit complementarities in traditional and non-traditional banking
The composite cost and profit functions were estimated to test hypothesis 1 -scope
economies increasing in traditional activities with off-balance sheet technological and informational
improvements- and hypothesis 2 –cross-selling benefits from output diversification beyond the
balance sheet. Estimated parameters are shown in the Appendix B. Table 3 presents the results for
the cost function. Global scope economies in the joint production of balance sheet outputs –loans,
deposits and other earning assets- rise to 19% where a 3% correspond to fixed scope economies
and a 16% to cost complementarities. These economies decrease monotonically with
diversification. However, when the output includes off-balance sheet –adding loan commitments to
loans and mutual funds to other earning assets- these economies move up to 44%, showing the
potential complementarities beyond the balance sheet.
The results are even more informative when analyzing cost complementarities between
output pairs. Economies between deposits and loans rise to 11% although they increase to 42% if
loan commitments are considered together with loans, showing the relevance of relationship
lending on achieving the theoretically assumed complementarities of traditional banking (Kashyap
et al., 1999). Nevertheless, the cost differences between traditional and market-based activities are
clearly reflected in the diseconomies found between loans (or deposits) and other earning assets,
even when mutual funds activities are included, a result in line with Jagtiani et al. (1995). However,
as shown above, the overall effects of diversification seem to be positive from the cost perspective.
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 also need to be tested regarding the profit side. Table 4 shows the
main results derived from the profit composite function. Estimated global profit scope economies
are negative (-22%) when considering only balance sheet outputs. Nevertheless, these global
diseconomies disappear when adding off-balance sheet services –where profit opportunities are
expected to be higher- to output mix, becoming virtually zero, a similar result to Berger et al. (1996)
for the US. Complementarities between output pairs, however, reveal some interesting additional
information. First of all, estimated profit complementarities between deposits and loans are
unexpectedly negative (-34%). However, this situation reverses if loan commitments are included
together with loans, showing that profit advantages in Spanish traditional banking only appear when
the connection between lending activity and deposit services is widely defined. Secondly,
complementarities between loans and securities appear in the profit side and are high and
significant (79%). Put simply, this result may be showing the portfolio complementarities between
loans and market-based activities. These benefits are even higher if mutual funds are included
along with other earning assets. Finally, profit complementarities between deposits and other
earning assets are negative, even when mutual funds are included, apparently rejecting profit
cross-selling advantages between traditional and non-traditional saving products.
Overall, hypothesis 1 seem to be plausible since there appear to be significant
improvements in cost and profit scope economies when lending and deposit taking activities are
considered together with off-balance sheet’ loan commitments, showing the relevance of defining
properly the scope of relationship lending. Secondly, regarding hypothesis 2, profit improvements
have also been found with output diversification beyond the balance sheet although these benefits
are more significant among certain outputs than globally and, apparently, there are not cross-selling
advantages between deposits and other savings instruments such as mutual funds.
5.2. One-stop banking beyond the balance sheet
Together with costs and profits, complementarities in the consumption of banking services
when including off-balance sheet business (hypothesis 3) are obtained by estimating revenue
scope economies. The results from the revenue composite function are shown in Table 5 (the
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estimated parameters are also shown in the Appendix B). Global revenue scope diseconomies are
found between balance sheet outputs. The positive value of the fixed economies component has to
be considered as spurious since it would imply positive revenues when the output level is zero
16.
However, the diseconomies turn positive although insignificant (1%) when off-balance sheet
business is included. Estimated fixed scope economies are zero, as expected, in this case.
In any event, it is difficult to appreciate how consumers value one-stop banking globally.
Therefore, revenue complementarities between specific financial services are shown. According to
Berger, Humphrey and Pulley (1996), revenue complementarities are not found between loans and
deposits. Moreover, they are negative (-15%). It should be noted, however, that the valuation of the
joint supply of lending and deposit services become positive and significant (29%) when including
loans commitments along with loans. As for profits, there are also revenue complementarities
between loans and other earning assets (54%) that are even higher when including off-balance
sheet activities such as mutual funds (88%) showing the positive valuation of a wide range of
financial possibilities by households and firms. However, as for profits, consumers do not appear to
value the joint consumption of deposits services with other earning assets. Therefore, regarding
hypothesis 3, consumers apparently value one-stop banking in Spain, although this valuation can
be only detected when including off-balance sheet business along with traditional services.
Since both cost and (profit) revenue complementarities have been found, these results will
be only valid in a less than competitive environment. This is shown in the next subsection, where
changes in market power and market structure with output mix are estimated.
5.3.Robustness check for scope economies estimations: a five-output composite
function.
As indicated above, a five-output composite function is also estimated to check for the
robustness of the results to changes in scale with innovations. Off-balance sheet activities (mutual
funds and loan commitments) are considered here as different outputs so that their informational
properties cannot be jointly assessed although each one of them can be related separately to the

16 As imilar result is obtained in Berger et al. (1996).
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rest of the outputs within this alternative definition. Therefore, these estimations will serve as to
check for the robustness of the results to changes in scale effects and to analyze complementarities
for each one of the five activities separately.
The results for the cost, profit and revenue global scope economies and output-pair
complementarities are shown in Table 6. Overall, these results are clearly in line with those
obtained employing the aggregation method since global cost scope economies are positive and
significant (23%) and profit and revenue global scope economies are also found to be positive but
lower (2% and 5%, respectively). Consequently, these results –as those obtained when aggregating
off-balance sheet outputs- contrast with the profit and revenue diseconomies found within the
traditional output mix definition (loans, deposits and other earning assets) in earlier studies.
Complementarities between outputs are also in accordance with the aggregation method results.
Significant cost and profit complementarities are found between the various combinations of loans,
deposits and loan commitments (ranging from 0.16% to 0.46%), while significant revenue
complementarities between deposits and loan commitments, as well as between loans and loan
commitments are also found. These results appear to show the relevance of lending relationships in
explaining the transformation function of bank intermediaries. Finally, important profit and revenue
complementarities are found between loans and other earning assets and between loans and
mutual funds, showing their cross-selling and portfolio diversification advantages, while profit and
revenue diseconomies are found between deposits and mutual funds.
5.4. The market power beyond the balance sheet
Spanish bank market structure should be explored to contrast if diversification has brought
significant changes in competition among Spanish banks (hypothesis 4). These results are shown
in Table 7. The Lerner index is computed from the FF as to compare the evolution of competition
within the Spanish banking industry alternatively employing a traditional definition of bank output
(total assets) and a definition of output beyond the balance sheet (total assets plus loan
commitments and mutual funds). The results suggest an increase in competition between 1993 and
1999 when only balance sheet business is considered. When adding off-balance sheet outputs, the
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Lerner index rises significantly
17 and it seems to be higher in large, well diversified banks.
Therefore, diversification may imply a countervailing effect to the rising competition in traditional
markets, increasing non-interest revenue and fee-earning activities as to compensate the reduction
in loan rates.
How these changes have affected the underlying market structure? The H-statistic was
computed for both balance sheet output definition and the alternative output definition (including
loan commitments and mutual funds). The estimations were undertaken considering interest
revenue and total revenue separately. As shown in Table 7, the estimated values of the H-statistic
when the output is total assets are 0.48 (interest revenue) and 0.59 (total revenue). Including off-
balance sheet activities, these values are 0.45 (interest revenue) and 0.57 (total revenue).
Hypotheses H=0 and H=1 can be rejected in all cases and therefore, monopolistic competition
holds. Long-run equilibrium seem to be achieved in all cases, as shown also in Table 7, since the
H-statistic is not significantly different from zero when ROA is employed as the dependent variable.
Combining the mark-up and Lerner index results with the H-statistic, it can be argued that
perfect competition does not seem to characterize Spanish bank market’ structure. Although off-
balance sheet business may alter the competition indicators, the changes are not significant
enough as to modify the estimated market structure.
6. The coexistence of cost and revenue complementarities: conclusions and competitive
caveats
 Innovations and changes in regulation are changing the financial landscape all over the
world. Financial institutions, as multiouput technologies, are largely conditioned by the development
of new products and the limits imposed by regulation to diversify their activities beyond the
traditional bounds (broad banking). Since both innovations and regulations have experienced
significant transformations across countries and over time, we wonder the extent to which those
changes may be affecting banks’ cost, profit and revenue differently. Many previous studies have

17 Am ean-difference test was applied to test for the significance of changes in the Lerner index both across
time and between the different output definitions.
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analyzed these parameters but most of them refer to the US in the pre-deregulated environment,
with different methodologies to model multioutput technologies and rarely considering off-balance
sheet business.
The Spanish banking system seems to be a good laboratory to study the behavior of cost,
profits and revenues in a ‘broad banking environment’ including new business lines in the output
mix. Ac omposite function is employed to estimate cost, profit and revenue economies of scope.
Three main hypotheses were tested. The main results confer an important role to output mix in
revealing cost, profit or revenue scope economies and complementarities between output pairs. In
particular, certain cost and profit complementarities predicted in theoretical models (ie., between
deposits and loans) only appear when their off-balance sheet technological expansion (loan
commitments) is incorporated (hypothesis 1), while other cost and profit global scope economies
improved significantly when including mutual funds along with other earning assets, showing certain
cross-selling and portfolio diversification benefits (hypothesis 2). Together, revenue
complementarities were computed as a proxy for consumer valuation of one-stop banking, as the
joint supply of various financial services (hypothesis 3). Revenue complementarities between
deposits and loans were only found when loan commitments were included, while
complementarities between loans and other earning assets increased significantly when mutual
funds were added. The results obtained in a ‘broad banking system’ contrast with previous
evidence in more restricted environments.
Finally, it should noted that the coexistence of costs and profit (revenue) complementarities
is possible under a less than perfectly competitive environment, as it has been empirically tested by
analyzing market power with output diversification (hypothesis 4). However, the results of the
competitive analysis reveal that diversification increases market power although these changes
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APPENDIX A. COST AND PROFIT ISSUES AND OUTPUT MIX. SOME
ILLUSTRATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS
Authors Year Scope Output Methodology Contribution





























































business on risk and
profitability











Jagtiani et al. 1995 United States On and off-








Khantavit 1996 United States On and off-












funds at large banks
in terms ofr i s kand
return
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces28
Kashyap et al. 1999 Theoretical - -

























Braunstein 1992 United States Traditional Compositec o s t
function











































APPENDIX B. PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR COMPOSITEC O S T ,P R OFIT AND
REVENUE FUNCTIONS
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A1. PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE COMPOSITE COST
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TABLE 1. REGULATORY TREATMENT OF THE MIXING OF BANKING, SECURITIES AND
INSURANCE ACTIVITIES AND THE MIXING OF BANKING AND COMMERCE (1997)









AUSTRIA Unrestricted Permitted Unrestricted Unrestricted
BELGIUM Permitted Permitted Restricted Unrestricted
DENMARK Unrestricted Permitted Permitted Unrestricted
FINLAND Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted
FRANCE Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted
GERMANY UnrestrictedR e s t r i c ted Unrestricted Unrestricted
GREECE Permitted Restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted
IRELAND Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted
ITALY Unrestricted Permitted Restricted Restricted
LUXEMBURG Unrestricted Permitted Unrestricted Restricted
NETHERLANDS Unrestricted Permitted Unrestricted Unrestricted
PORTUGAL Unrestricted Permitted Permitted Unrestricted
SPAIN UnrestrictedP e r m i t t ed Unrestricted Permitted
SWEDEN Unrestricted Permitted Restricted Unrestricted
UNITED
KINGDOM
Unrestricted Permitted Unrestricted Unrestricted
UNITED STATES Restricted Prohibited, generally Prohibited, generally Prohibited, generally
JAPAN Restricted Prohibited Restricted Prohibited, generally
Notes:
FORS E CURITIES AND INSURANCE:
 Unrestricted: A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted directly by the bank.
 Permitted: A full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must be conducted in subsidiaries.
 Restricted: Less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries.
 Prohibited: The activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or the subsidiaries.
FOR THE OWNERSHIP OF COMMERCIAL FIRMS OR OTHER COMMERCIAL BANKS:
 Unrestricted: 100 percent ownership permitted.
 Permitted: Unrestricted but ownership is limited based upon bank’s equity capital.
 Restricted: Less than 100 percent ownership.
 Prohibited: Prohibited.
Securities activities include underwriting, dealing with brokering all kinds of activities and all aspects of the mutual fund
business. Insurance activities include underwriting and selling insurance products/services as principal as agent.
Source: Barth, Brumbaugh and Wilcox (2000)
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mutual funds assets (euro million)
loan commitments generated (euro million)
customer loans (euro million)
securities, equity shares and industrial participations (euro million)
non-bank deposits (euro million)
market share of banks in the mutual fund industry (right axis)
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
Note: The assets managed by bank sectorcorrespond to consolidated business including
subsidiaries such as bank-owned mutual or pension funds management companies
or insurance and brokerage firms. Non bank sector includesspecialized credit
institutions, insurance companies, mutual and pension funds companies, finance
companies security brokers and dealers and other funding corporations.
Source: Bank Profitability (OECD) and national financial accounts.







SPAIN GERMANY FRANCE UNITED
KINGDOM*
UNITED
STATES* *C o m m e r c i a lbanks only
Assets managed by non-bank sector
Assets managed by bank sector
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TC 290.3 403.2 84.2 772.3
PF 71.8 145.5 14.5 306.3
TR 385.0 356.7 95.5 804.8
LN 3016.8 6408.2 852.1 17386.2
DP 3309.5 5947.9 926.4 17687.3
OE 1204.9 2273.8 118.2 5358.9
LC 1701.7 3141.2 69.3 6397.1
MF 2372.0 4824.7 542.5 8897.3
DC 0.053 0.054 0.043 0.072
SC 16.40 26.78 12.13 29.38
KC 0.18 0.30 0.11 0.46
   
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TABLE 3. COST SCOPE ECONOMIES AND COMPLEMENTARITIES AND OUTPUT MIX.
SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM (1993-1999).
Composite function results (testing hypotheses 1 and 2)
Global scope economies>0 = economies; Global scope economies<0 = diseconomies
3I nputs: deposits, labor and physical capital
Number of observations = 531
GLOBAL COST SCOPE ECONOMIES
(1) Output mix (deposits; loans; securities + other earning assets)
Specialization Global scope economies Fixed-scope economies Cost complementarities
ε =0 . 0 0.19* 0.03* 0.16*
ε =0 . 0 1 0.18* 0.03* 0.15*
ε =0 . 0 5 0.14* 0.03* 0.11*
ε =0 . 1 0.10* 0.03* 0.07*
ε =0 . 2 0.03* 0.03* 0.00*
ε =0 . 3 0.01* 0.04* -0.03*
(2) Output mix (deposits; loans + loan commitments; securities + other earning assets + mutual
funds)
Specialization Global scope economies Fixed-scope economies Cost complementarities
ε =0 . 0 0.44 0.01 0.43*
ε =0 . 0 1 0.39 0.02 0.37*
ε =0 . 0 5 0.21 0.02 0.19
ε =0 . 1 0.32 0.02 0.30
ε =0 . 2 -0.23* 0.02 -0.25*
ε =0 . 3 -0.35* 0.02 -0.37*









ε =0 . 0 0.11* -0.58* -0.24*
ε =0 . 0 1 0.10* -0.57* -0.24*
ε =0 . 0 5 0.02* -0.55* -0.26*
ε =0 . 1 0.02* -0.52* -0.28*
ε =0 . 2 -0.21* -0.46* -0.32*
ε =0 . 3 -0.32* -0.38* -0.35*
Specialization Complementarities deposits-
loans + loan commitments
Complementaritiesl o a ns-
securities + other earning
assets + mutual funds
Complementarities
deposits-securities + other
earning assets + mutual
funds
ε =0 . 0 0.42* -0.63* 0.06*
ε =0 . 0 1 0.36* -0.64* 0.03*
ε =0 . 0 5 0.15 -0.65 -0.07
ε =0 . 1 -0.08 -0.67 -0.20
ε =0 . 2 -0.41* -0.67* -0.40
ε =0 . 3 -0.57* -0.61* -0.55*
*s t a tistically significant at 1 per cent level
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TABLE 4. PROFIT SCOPE ECONOMIES AND COMPLEMENTARITIES AND OUTPUT MIX.
SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM (1993-1999).
Composite function results (testing hypotheses 1 and 2)
Global scope economies>0 = economies; Global scope economies<0 = diseconomies
3I nputs: deposits, labor and physical capital
Number of observations = 531
GLOBAL PROFIT SCOPE ECONOMIES
(1) Output mix (deposits; loans; securities + other earning assets)
Specialization Global scope economies Fixed-scope economies Cost complementarities
ε =0 . 0 -0.22 0.13 -0.35*
ε =0 . 0 1 -0.21 0.15 -0.36*
ε =0 . 0 5 -0.18 0.17 -0.35
ε =0 . 1 -0.14 0.15 -0.29
ε =0 . 2 -0.09* 0.13 -0.22*
ε =0 . 3 -0.06* 0.19 -0.25*
(2) Output mix (deposits; loans + loan commitments; securities + other earning assets + mutual
funds)
Specialization Global scope economies Fixed-scope economies Cost complementarities
ε =0 . 0 0.01 0.00 0.01*
ε =0 . 0 1 0.01 0.00 0.01*
ε =0 . 0 5 -0.02 0.00 -0.02
ε =0 . 1 -0.06 0.00 -0.06
ε =0 . 2 -0.11* 0.00 -0.11*
ε =0 . 3 -0.14* 0.00 -0.14*









ε =0 . 0 -0.34* 0.79* -0.09*
ε =0 . 0 1 -0.32* 0.78* -0.09*
ε =0 . 0 5 -0.25 0.70 -0.06*
ε =0 . 1 -0.16 0.62 -0.01
ε =0 . 2 -0.27* 0.17* -0.17*
ε =0 . 3 0.15* 0.26* 0.18*
Specialization Complementarities deposits-
loans + loan commitments
Complementaritiesl o a ns-
securities + other earning
assets + mutual funds
Complementarities
deposits-securities + other
earning assets + mutual
funds
ε =0 . 0 0.31* 0.87* -0.15*
ε =0 . 0 1 0.31* 0.84* -0.14*
ε =0 . 0 5 0.29* 0.75* -0.10*
ε =0 . 1 0.27* 0.64* -0.04*
ε =0 . 2 0.24* 0.40* 0.07*
ε =0 . 3 0.24* 0.28* 0.19*
*s t a tistically significant at 1 per cent level
E2004/1337
TABLE 5. REVENUE SCOPE ECONOMIES AND COMPLEMENTARITIES AND OUTPUT
MIX. SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM (1993-1999).
Composite function results (testing hypothesis 3)
Global scope economies>0 = economies; Global scope economies<0 = diseconomies
3I nputs: deposits, labor and physical capital
Number of observations = 531
GLOBAL REVENUE SCOPE ECONOMIES
(1) Output mix (deposits; loans; securities + other earning assets)
Specialization Global scope economies Fixed-scope economies Cost complementarities
ε =0 . 0 -0.09 0.19 -0.28
ε =0 . 0 1 -0.08 0.15 -0.23
ε =0 . 0 5 -0.07 0.14 -0.21
ε =0 . 1 -0.06* 0.18 -0.24*
ε =0 . 2 -0.04* 0.11 -0.15*
ε =0 . 3 -0.03* 0.21 -0.24*
(2) Output mix (deposits; loans + loan commitments; securities + other earning assets + mutual
funds)
Specialization Global scope economies Fixed-scope economies Cost complementarities
ε =0 . 0 0.01 0.00 0.01
ε =0 . 0 1 0.01 0.00 0.01
ε =0 . 0 5 -0.02 0.00 -0.02
ε =0 . 1 -0.04 0.00 -0.04
ε =0 . 2 -0.08* 0.00 -0.08*
ε =0 . 3 -0.09* 0.00 -0.09*









ε =0 . 0 -0.15 0.54* -0.16
ε =0 . 0 1 -0.12 0.53* -0.13
ε =0 . 0 5 -0.08 0.50* -0.08
ε =0 . 1 0.03 0.46* -0.04
ε =0 . 2 0.12* 0.38* 0.11*
ε =0 . 3 0.18* 0.28* 0.17*
Specialization Complementarities deposits-
loans + loan commitments
Complementaritiesl o a ns-
securities + other earning
assets + mutual funds
Complementarities
deposits-securities + other
earning assets + mutual
funds
ε =0 . 0 0.29* 0.88* -0.86*
ε =0 . 0 1 0.29* 0.86* -0.83*
ε =0 . 0 5 0.27* 0.78* -0.67*
ε =0 . 1 0.26* 0.68* -0.49*
ε =0 . 2 0.25* 0.50* -0.14*
ε =0 . 3 0.25* 0.34* 0.16*
*s t a tistically significant at 1 per cent level



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 7. OUPUT MIX AND RELATED CHANGES IN SPANISH BANKING MARKET
STRUCTURE (1993-1999).
Number of observations = 531
LERNER INDEX
Composite cost function results
Basis points = BP
Lerner (total assets) (%) Lerner (total assets + loan
commitments + mutual funds) (%)
1993-1995 19.7 31.5
1996-1999 12.9 34.3
ENTIRE PERIOD 15.4 32.3
H-PANZAR ROSSE






Total assets Total assets +


















MC:m onopolistic competition (H=0 and H=1 hypotheses rejected)
LRE: Long-run equilibrium (H=0 not rejected when Return on Assets is employed as dependent variable)
NOTE: All the estimations reported were statistically significant at 1 per cent level.
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